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The link between risk-taking and past performance has recently come to prominence in the finance
literature, and for good reason. On the empirical side, there is ample evidence that past trading
performance can affect an investor’s future trading decisions. For example, Odean (1998) has shown
that individual investors prefer to sell past winners rather than past losers, and Coval and Shumway
(2001) find that market makers in Treasury Bond futures contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade
are far more likely to take on additional risk following morning losses than morning gains. On
the theoretical side, a growing body of work looks at the impact of past performance on investor
psychology. The resulting theories of disposition, overconfidence and dynamic loss aversion offer
powerful explanations for a variety of asset pricing anomalies.
Notwithstanding the attention such “performance dependence” has received, there are wide gaps
in the literature, and much remains to be understood. With some exceptions, the bulk of empirical
research has looked at the equity trading of individual investors. A principal goal is to extend
the empirical analysis of past performance to include other investor classes, and in particular,
institutional investors. Institutional asset holdings now dwarf directly-held individual holdings in
G7 countries, especially the U.S. and the U.K. It may be that institutional investors mimic individual
investors in their sensitivity to past performance, but there are good reasons why this might not be
the case. Professional money managers manage “other people’s money,” and so face substantially
different incentives and reward structures from individual investors. This could alter the effect of
past performance on their risk-taking, raising the question as to whether past performance matters
for equilibrium pricing.
More important than simply establishing the prevalence of performance dependence, however, is
identifying the precise channels through which it operates. To some extent, the theoretical literature
has gotten ahead of the data here. Models based on the disposition effect (Grinblatt and Han
(2002)), overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001)), prospect theory (Barberis,
Huang and Santos (2001)) and the like show great promise, yet these models will remain vulnerable
to the “Fama critique” until the specific links between past performance and risk taking that they
posit can be shown to have empirical content.1 As discussed in the roundup of the literature in
Section 2, some progress has been made in this direction, either through direct testing on individual
investors (Glaser and Weber, 2003) or examination of the aggregate market predictions of a theory
(Grinblatt and Han (2002)), but there is much that remains untested.
In this paper we take up the challenge of moving forward on both of these fronts. Our medium
is a proprietary dataset encompassing the complete currency trades of 512 large institutional funds
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over the period 1994–2002. Our main findings are striking. Past performance manifestly affects
currency risk-taking, but the sign and magnitude of this effect differs substantially from what has
been observed for individual investors. There is no evidence whatsoever of disposition effects: rather,
the dominant feature of the behavior is aggressive risk-cutting in the wake of losses. We term this
the stop-loss effect. Profits do bring some increase in risk-taking, but this increase reverses within
a calendar quarter. The effect is pervasive across the major currencies, and characteristic of both
foreign exchange and bond funds, though not pure equity funds. It is also more prominent later in
the year, and among older and more experienced funds.
In teasing out an explanation for these patterns, we argue that disposition effect theories are
simply not relevant. Both overconfidence theories and models of changing loss aversion offer a rea-
sonable explanation for the increase in risk following profits, but neither does a good job explaining
the scale of the stop-loss effect. Our conclusion is that overconfidence and loss aversion theories,
while consistent with the evidence, need to be modified in important ways if they are to adequately
account for the observed investor behavior.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the current
state of theoretical and empirical knowledge on peformance dependence. A description of the nature
and characteristics of our data follows in Section II. Section III presents the main empirical results
on the link between risk-taking and past performance, both unconditionally and conditional on
long-horizon performance, age and experience. Section IV summarizes our conclusions.
I. Performance dependence
A. The current state of play
The link between risk-taking and past performance receives short shrift in the traditional, rational
finance literature. As Coval and Shumway (2001) put it, in a setting where traders have standard
Von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility, profit opportunities are uncorrelated across the trading
day, wealth effects are negligible, margin effects are unimportant and traders are fully rational,
profits are not related to future trading activity.
Appealing though this view is, it is at odds with much of the available evidence. As already
mentioned, Odean (1998) shows that individual investors are apt to sell past winners before past
losers, a phenomenon earlier dubbed the disposition effect by Shefrin and Statman (1985). Further
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evidence of the disposition effect has come from many sources, so much so that Dhar and Zhu (2002)
term it one of the widely documented biases in investor behavior.2 Other forms of performance
dependence are also manifest. Coval and Shumway (2001) find that market makers in Treasury
Bond futures contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade are far more likely to take on additional risk
following morning losses than morning gains. Linnainmaa (2003) finds that day traders in Finland
look at recent rather than total trading losses in deciding whether to continue their day-trading
activities.
Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) catalog some rational reasons why performance dependence might
occur. An investor may elect to sell his winners to maintain a desired asset allocation balance, or
because the fundamental value he was seeking at the time he put on the trade has been realized.3
For taxable investors, tax structure provides an incentive towards disposal of assets with short-
term capital losses. Accounting structure may create incentives for so-called “window-dressing.”
Company size may be a determinant of portfolio membership, either exogenously or through its
impact on transactions costs, creating a link between price and trading.4
A problem with many of these explanations is that, when brought to the data, they don’t seem to
account for the performance dependence that is observed. Lakonishok and Smidt (1986) report that
tax incentives are a secondary influence on trading. Odean (1998) writes that the strong preference
to dispose of winners rather than losers displayed by the investors in his dataset cannot be attributed
to portfolio rebalancing, subsequent portfolio peformance, transactions costs or tax considerations.
A striking finding by Odean (1998) is that stocks that are sold tend to outperform those that are
not, suggesting that beliefs in mean-reversion to targets are irrational. Overall, Barberis and Thaler
(2002) conclude that it is hard to account for the disposition effect on rational grounds.
A growing body of research, therefore, attempts to explain performance dependence in terms of
investor psychology. There are two strands of work here. One strand focuses on investor beliefs, and
argues that investors become overconfident in their ability to assess the moments of asset returns
in the aftermath of investment success. This in turn may lead to increased risk-taking. Gervais and
Odean (2001) develop a model in this vein in which periods of profitability are followed by periods
of higher trading, a correlation observed amongst individual investors by Barber and Odean (2000),
and Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2003). Their model also predicts that experience will temper
overconfidence. Locke and Mann (2001) confirm that, among professional traders on the floor of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, traders with more experience are less likely to take more risk after
a period of abnormally good profits. Glaser and Weber (2003) argue that it is differences in beliefs
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about first moments, as opposed to second moments, that is at the root of such findings.
The second strand focuses on investor preferences. Based on experimental evidence, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) provide a description of how people depart from expected utility theory when
offered a single risky gamble. Their description, called prospect theory, has three elements: (a)
gains and losses matter, not the level of final wealth; (b) people are more sensitive to losses than
gains; and (c) people are risk-averse over gains, and risk-seeking over losses. (a) and (b) appear
to be common sense, yet together they represent a profound departure from traditional finance
theory.5 We, like Barberis and Thaler (2002) use the term “loss aversion” to refer to (a) and (b).6
In the absence of a generally accepted term, we use the label “value inflection” to refer to (c), since
it implies concavity of the utility function over gains and convexity of the function over losses.
This theory of a single risky gamble has been applied by a number of authors to explain the
disposition effect. In particular, value inflection implies that investors would prefer to take the
risk that their losing position improves rather than sell it now for a certain loss. Other theories
of performance dependence are based on an extension of prospect theory to sequences of gambles.
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) (hereafter BHS) point out that, if an investor cumulates his
gains and losses, value inflection would seem to imply that he is more likely to take risk after a
series of bad outcomes, and less likely after a series of good outcomes. This runs counter to the
experimental evidence. Thaler and Johnson (1990), for example, show that individual willingness
to take risk increases following recent success, an effect termed the “house-money” effect. To square
prospect theory with such “mental accounting” (Thaler, 1990), BHS look to loss aversion rather
than value-inflection. Specifically, they suggest that loss aversion increases as losses cumulate, and
falls as gains cumulate. We label this “dynamic loss aversion.”
The importance of these theoretical developments based on performance dependence cannot be
underestimated. If true, the theories offer potential explanations for some of the most enduring
asset pricing pricing anomalies. BHS argue that if changes in the value of holdings matter to
investors, then the effect of prior outcomes goes some way towards explaining the three main
puzzles associated with aggregate stock market behavior: the equity premium, excess volatility and
long-horizon predictability. Grinblatt and Han’s (2002) model of the disposition effect shows that it
can give rise to price momentum. Goetzmann and Massa (2003) show that a disposition effect factor
constructed from the Grinblatt-Han model should be priced as a risk factor. In short, performance
dependence matters because it can affect equilibrium prices.
Prospect Theory and Institutional Investors 5
B. The gaps in the literature
Taken together, this represents an impressive and promising body of knowledge. However, there
are two obvious gaps that need to be filled. First, in order to know whether performance depen-
dence is a market-wide phenomenon, there is a need to extend empirical research to include other
investor classes. In particular, the empirical work needs to encompass institutional investors. As
mentioned earlier, assets under institutional management exceed direct holdings of equity and fixed
income securities by a good margin, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. As of 1997, the ratio of
institutional to direct holdings was 1.5 across G7 households (Davis, 2000).7 Despite this, virtually
no empirical work has been done on this dominant investor class.
It is not just the scale of institutional assets that necessitates their study. The more potent
motivation is that there are good reasons why performance dependence might take on a very different
character within this investor class. Consider first incentives. Institutional investors typically receive
a fixed percentage of assets under management as compensation. This creates a more complex
relationship between performance and manager wealth than is true for the individual investor. A
manager who loses money on behalf of his clients will see his compensation fall in direct proportion
to assets under management, but he also faces the risk of redemptions from his fund, which would
further erode his stream of income. The opposite is true, of course, when a manager achieves good
performance. Going beyond fixed fees, institutional portfolio managers often receive performance-
related compensation in the form of a bonus or direct participation in profits. Option-like payout
structures are apt to further complicate the link between past peformance and risk-taking.
Leaving aside incentives, there is the possibility that professional managers simply behave dif-
ferently. There is some evidence to suggest this. In their investigation of brokerage investors in the
Israeli market, Shapira and Venezia (2001), find that those who trade professionally are less prone
to disposition effects than independent investors. Dhar and Zhu (2002) show that while individual
investors exhibit the disposition effect on average, fully one fifth of the investors do not. Investor
characteristics that temper the disposition effect include income level, professional occupation and
trading experience. Cutting the other way is evidence from Griffin and Tversky (1992) that experts
tend to be more overconfident than relatively inexperienced individuals.
The very promise of the theoretical models discussed above creates the second gap that needs to
be filled: empirical identification of the most relevant theories. Consider the competing explanations
offered for the equity momentum puzzle, the tendency of stock returns to persist over horizons of
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a quarter to a year. Grinblatt and Han (2002) argue that the disposition effect is responsible. A
relative willingness to close profitable trades before loss-making ones creates an excess supply of
stocks with aggregate capital gains, and an excess demand for stocks with aggregate capital losses.
In the equilibrium, this can generate momentum. Contrast this with the theory of dynamic loss
aversion offered by BHS. In their framework, risk tolerance is directly related to past profitability,
so that investors’ willingness to take on risk decreases in the wake of losses. This leads to follow-on
purchases of stocks that do well, and follow-on sales of stocks that do poorly, generating momentum.
In a similar vein, theories of overconfidence predict that profits will lead investors to overestimate
the precision of their expected returns, creating excess demand for stocks that have performed well.
How can these theories be empirically distinguished and validated? The linchpin is the sign of
the performance dependence. Theories based on the disposition effect rely on increased willingness
to take on risk in the wake of losses, relative to profits. Theories of dynamic loss aversion and
overconfidence, by contrast, predict a decreased tolerance for risk in the wake of losses. Thus, at
a basic level, measuring the sign and magnitude of the influence of past performance will help to
discriminate among these theories. This is but one simple example, albeit an important one, of how
more data analysis is needed in order to circumvent the Fama critique.
C. The contributions of this paper
This paper focuses exclusively on institutional investors. In particular, it looks at the daily currency
trading activity of 512 large institutional funds over the period 1994–2002. While many of these
funds also manage equities and fixed income securities, there are some good reasons to look in the
first instance at their currency activity. More so than equity or fixed income trades, currency trades
are driven by the fund manager rather than the underlying stakeholder. If the stakeholders in a
technology mutual fund sell after declines in net asset value, the fund manager himself sells the
constituent stocks of the fund. In order to capture the direct effect of past performance at the
institutional level, one needs to be able to identify the actively managed piece of the fund. In other
words, the question is whether the fund manager’s choice between, say, Dell and Gateway stock
is influenced by his own performance in allocating across these stocks.8 Second, forward currency
contracts are derivatives, in zero net supply. This eliminates the possibility of aggregate capital
gains or losses at the level of each currency, which alters the pricing implications that come from
theories such as the Grinblatt and Han (2002) model.
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[Table I here]
The level of detail in the dataset allows us to go some way towards identifying the relevant
theories of performance dependence for this investor class. Table I gives the taxonomy of questions
that we address using both the cross-sectional and time-series variation in the data, together with
the rationale for each. The questions are broadly divided into three categories. In the first, “Basic
dynamics,” the goal is to size up the degree of performance dependence that is present. Any link
between risk-taking and lagged P&L represents a departure from the bulk of traditional finance
theory. A finding that lagged performance impacts risk-taking negatively would tend to support
theories of disposition effects, whereas evidence to the contrary would lend support to theories
of overconfidence and dynamic loss aversion. We also wish to know whether any performance
dependence measured is economically relevant. In the second category, “Conditional dynamics,”
the questions investigate the difference between past gains and losses, and also the extent to which
the effects measured are sensitive to cumulative of losses. This gets at the question of whether
investors integrate outcomes across sequences of trades, or treat them independently. In addition,
we look for the presence of calendar effects in the data. It is often noted that investment manager
performance bonuses are paid annually, typically on a calendar-year cycle. This could well give rise
to different degrees of performance dependence early and late in the year.
In the third category, “Cross-sectional features,” we use the latitude of the dataset to look at a
variety of potentially important cross-sectional characteristics: currency, fund type, fund age and
fund experience matter. To the extent that it is present, behavioral tendencies are expected to
attenuate as investors gain in experience. This tempering is central to the model of Barber and
Odean (2000), and Locke and Mann (2001) use it to provide an identification scheme for empirically
distinguishing between overconfidence and dynamic loss aversion. Finally, we gauge the scope of
framing. The theory of narrow framing (Redelmeier and Tversky (1992)) implies that performance
dependence will operate at the level of the individual currency—there will be no cross-asset or
portfolio effects. Hence it is of interest to know whether it is single-currency or portfolio losses that
are at the root of performance dependence.
A critical dimension of all of these tests is the time-period over which gains and losses are
measured, and over which they exert an influence on future decisions. Here the extant theory offers
us less guidance. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) argue that, with Kahneman and Tversky-type loss
aversion, the equity premium can be reconciled with the outstanding supply of stocks and bonds
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if investors evaluate their gains and losses once a year. This may make sense at the level of the
individual investor: as Barberis and Thaler (2002) note, we receive our most comprehensive mutual
fund reports once a year, and do our taxes once a year. For institutional investors, however, this
time frame may not be appropriate. Coval and Shumway (2001) write that: “...when fund managers
are averse to losses, it is not clear whether their aversion relates to monthly, quarterly or annual
horizons.” They argue that the most important advantage of their dataset is that the time horizon
is clear: CBOT market makers have incentives that encourage them to evaluate their performance
once a day. Rather than take a stance on a particular time horizon that is relevant, we consider a
number of fixed forecast horizons, and let the data choose the appropriate lag structure.
II. Data
A. Raw inputs
The data used in the analysis is provided by State Street Corporation, one of the world’s largest
investor services providers. State Street clients are primarily large institutional money managers,
and the total of all funds serviced by the Corporation is currently USD 8.4 trillion, approximately
16 percent of total global assets. Our sample covers the period December 31st, 1993–January 1st,
2003, and comprises over 8 million individual trade records undertaken by some 8,500 anonymous
funds. Each record provides us with the currency pair traded, the exchange rate, and the tenor or
duration of the contract.
Given the distributional assumptions needed for estimation, quality of the data series is impor-
tant. Hence the analysis is restricted to the the larger funds in the universe, as these tend to have
more frequent, continuous trading. Moreover, only trades in the 11 major currencies are included.9
Mindful of survivorship bias, the requirement for inclusion in our sample is that a fund be in the
95th percentile of trading volume in one or more of 6 regularly sampled weeks over the nine-year
sample period. This criterion selected a subset of 512 funds that account for an average of 72
percent of the volume across the 11 currencies.
There are a number of important fund characteristics to look at. The first is fund life. Although
specific information on fund life is not available in the database, an examination of currency holdings
makes it clear that most of the funds are not active in the currency markets for the entire sample.
Indeed only two percent of the funds have nonzero currency holdings on every day of the sample.
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Of course, a fund manager may make an active decision to hold no open currency positions, so zero
holdings may not imply that a fund is “dead.” Cognizant of this, one way to proceed is to measure
the life of each fund from the first day of nonzero holdings to the last day of nonzero holdings, and
then to gauge the likelihood that this is a biased estimate from the incidence of zero holdings during
this estimated life. Calculated in this way, the mean fund life is about 4.5 years, while the incidence
of zero exposure throughout fund life is only 12 percent, suggesting that the lifespan estimates are
reasonable. A second important fund characteristic is base currency, since measured currency risk
ought to exclude base-currency holdings. The breakdown by base currency is as follows: U.S. dollar,
67 percent; Australian dollar 12 percent; Canadian dollar 6 percent; euro 3 percent; Japanese yen
3 percent; British pound 3 percent; others 6 percent. Finally, it will be of interest to consider
the underlying type of each fund. The database includes comprehensive information on the total
holdings of each fund by asset class for the year 2001. Based on this, the funds are classified as
fixed income, equity or currency for that year.10 The resulting categorization comprises 158 fixed
income funds, 71 equity funds and 149 currency funds.
B. Basic series
The first step is to construct flow and holdings series for each fund across the currencies. Each day,
net flows by currency, fund and tenor are measured.11 All flows on date t with tenor s are converted
to dollars by dividing by the appropriate forward currency exchange rate f st , where f is units of
foreign currency per dollar. Holdings are built up by cumulating these flows, after adjusting for
mark-to-market gains and losses on each day’s pre-existing positions. For a position with tenor s on
date t− 1, the marked-to-market gross return between date t− 1 and t is fst−1/fs−1t , reflecting the
fact that it is one day closer to maturity. It is these mark-to-market gains and losses that provide
the key profit-and-loss (P&L) series that are used to measure performance. Any currency holdings
that do come to maturity—that is, reach a tenor of zero—are treated as delivered, and removed
from holdings on value date. This would occur, for example, if a fund purchased and took delivery
of spot local currency to facilitate the purchase of an underlying equity or fixed income security.
Such transactions are common for fixed income and equity funds, so negative serial correlation at
short horizons is likely to be observed in the holdings series for such funds.
With holdings in hand, it is a simple matter to calculate the second key series—a measure of
risk exposure. Let hit be the vector of currency holdings for fund i on date t. Risk is measured
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as the standard quadratic form h′itΣhit, where Σ is the covariance matrix of annualized currency
returns constructed from exponentially-weighted daily currency returns12 The relevant Σ matrix
differs according to the base currency of each fund. For example, a euro position held by a dollar-
based fund entails much more risk than the same position held by a Scandinavian fund, relative to
base currency.
Figure 1 plots the holdings series for each of our currencies aggregated across all 512 funds,
grouped into four rough regions: North America, Japan and Antipodes, Europe and Scandinavia.
There is a large amount of variation in the raw holdings numbers, and so to render them comparable,
they are measured in units of trading days. For example, if a fund is long $5 million against the
euro, and the fund’s average daily EUR/USD volume is $1m, then it is counted as having 5 trading
days worth of holdings. Figure 1 illustrates that, throughout the sample, funds have tended to be
long the dollar and short other currencies. However, towards the end of the sample, this tendency
waned considerably.
Holdings tell only part of story, however, a fact that becomes abundantly clear when risk is
examined. Figure 2 plots the aggregate risk exposure held by the funds in each of the currencies.
Notice in particular that the exposure to the Japanese yen and British pound has remained quite
high in the recent period. This implies that, individually, the funds in the universe continue to
maintain large exposures to these currencies. Some funds are long and some funds are short, with
the positions netting out to give an aggregate holding of close to zero. In other words, there
is a considerable amount of disagreement across the fund positions. This cross-sectional richness
contributes to the statistical power of the data sample.
[Figure 1 here]
[Figure 2 here]
C. Persistence
It is well-established that portfolio flows in underlying assets such as equities tend to be persistent
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(see Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (2001)). The question arises as to whether the same is true for
institutional currency flows. Figure 3 plots the sample autocorrelation function for daily currency
risk exposures out to 20 lags, together with 95 percent confidence bands. The functions are plotted
for three different levels of aggregation. Panel (a), “Aggregated by currency and fund,” adds
up the total risk of all funds across all currencies to arrive at a single time series. Panel (b),
“Aggregated by currency,” adds up the total risk across all funds in each currency separately, and
shows the autocorrelation estimates for the currency panel. Analogously, Panel (c), “Aggregated
by fund,” adds up the total risk across all currencies for each fund, and shows the autocorrelation
estimates for the fund panel. At the aggregate and individual currency level, there is evidence of
positive serial correlation at the 1-day and 5-day frequencies. Interestingly, however, there is no
such persistence at the individual fund level.13 Individual funds are not persistent in their actions,
but funds tend to mimic one another. A substantially similar picture emerges from examination
of weekly risk autocorrelations. Overall, this echoes the Froot and Tjornhom (2002) finding of
statistically significant cross-fund lags in equity flows to developed and emerging markets.
Turning to performance, Figure 4 plots similiar sample autocorrelation functions for P&L. Here
there is no evidence of serial correlation, indicating that the lead-lag effects in risk-taking do not
engender persistent performance. Again, the same is true at weekly frequencies. The interesting
implication is that managers do not undergo cycles in profitability—for the most part, profits are
independent from one period to the next.
[Figure 3 here]
[Figure 4 here]
III. The evidence
A. Basic dynamics
The tool we use to address the questions under the “basic dynamics” heading is an unrestricted
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vector autoregression. Analogously to the serial correlation analysis presented above, we estimate
panel VARs for risk and P&L at the aggregate, the currency and the fund level. Figure 5 shows the
essential information that comes out of this exercise. The model allows for heteroskedasticity across
currencies and funds, and the lag length for each model is set at 13 weeks, the value selected by
the Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion for the panel fund regression. The first column of plots
in the figure shows the impact that a unit-standard deviation shock to P&L has on risk, while the
second column shows the impact that a unit-standard deviation shock to risk has on P&L. The
effects measured on the vertical axes are also scaled in standard deviation units, and 90 percent
confidence intervals based on the maximum likelihood standard errors are sketched in lighter weight
around each function. The own-equation effects are similar to those conveyed by Figures 3 and 4,
and so are omitted.
[Figure 5 here]
Performance dependence is manifest in the data. At all levels of aggregation, past performance
exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on risk-taking, and the impact persists for between
six and eight weeks. The economic impact is significant too: for the panel fund regression, a one-
standard deviation shock to P&L produces a one-standard deviation change in risk-taking after
four weeks. In dollar terms, this means that a $1 million dollar profit produces an increase in
currency holdings of approximately $0.3 million over the subsequent four weeks. Importantly, the
serial correlation estimates for P&L calculated earlier make clear that this result is not simply due
to persistence in profits or losses.14 Turning to the second column of plots, there is no appreciable
effect in the other direction: as might have been expected, increases in risk-taking do not have a
meaningful effect on profits. There is some indication that returns improve with risk-taking, though
naturally risk rises in tandem with this.
An important feature of these results is the relatively short horizon over which the effects play
out. True, a model estimated on weekly changes is hardly well-suited to capturing long-horizon
phenomena, but we find that the effects are no more durable when the model is re-fitted at the
monthly horizon. This is significant, because if performance dependence is to stand as a viable
explanation for the equity premium puzzle, excess volatility, long-horizon predictability and the
like, as its proponents argue, the effects must be long-lived. The dynamics measured here suggest
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that, at least in an unconditional sense, institutions have shorter memories. It remains to be seen
whether this is true in the various conditional cases which we look at below.
The most striking aspects of the results is the complete absence of any evidence of disposition
effects. Rather, risk-taking is directly proportional to performance, lending support to theories that
predict a positive relationship such as overconfidence or dynamic loss aversion. It turns out that
this conclusion is only strengthened when gains and losses are examined separately, and it is to this
that we now turn.
B. Conditional dynamics
There is some existing evidence that gains affect risk-taking in a manner different from losses.
Coval and Shumway (2001) find that, among Chicago Board of Trade proprietary traders, risk-
taking responds strongly to losses, but only weakly to profits, and Odean (1999) reports that while
losses are equally likely to produce buying or selling, gains are apt to lead to selling. Theory also
predicts some asymmetries. Consider the model of BHS. The baseline utility function they adopt
is shown as the heavier central line in Figure 6. This function, defined over gains and losses, is
almost identical to the loss averse function calibrated by Kahneman and Tversky, absent value
inflection. The innovation of the Barberis, Huang and Santos approach is in their modelling of
how this function changes in response to gains and losses. They conjecture that, after a gain, the
function slides down and to the left, becoming less concave, while after a loss, the function pivots
at the origin, becoming more concave.
[Figure 6 here]
[Figure 7 here]
To address this issue, we distinguish between the dynamic effects of gains and losses. Figure 7
plots separate impulse response functions for gains and losses, estimated from the fund-by-fund
data panel.15 There is in fact a striking difference in the two response functions. Gains produce
transitory increases in risk-taking that taper off after about six weeks. Beyond that there is evidence
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of “take-profit” activity as the impulse response function turns statistically negative. By contrast,
the effects of losses are both stronger and more permanent. We label this phenomenon the stop-loss
effect. Note that the impulse response function sketched in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 5 is
simply an average of these two functions. The implication is that the relatively short-lived average
effect illustrated there masks separate effects of gains and losses that appear to be durable.
The critical point to make here is that the shape of these impulse functions runs counter to much
of the existing empirical and theoretical work. The pattern of a modest increase in risk-taking
following gains coupled with aggressive risk-cutting following losses is not evident in any of the
existing empirical work. On the theoretical side, it is not consistent with any theoretical variant
of the disposition effect. Moreover, it does not square with the standard models of overconfidence.
To see this latter point, note that the asymmetry in overconfidence models goes the other way.
As Gervais and Odean (2001) write, overconfidence theory is premised on the psychological finding
of biased self-attribution: when people succeed, they believe that the success was due to their
personal abilities; when they fail, they attribute their failure to chance and outside factors.16 Thus
overconfidence would lead managers to extend their positions after gains, but not to cut their
positions after losses. Finally, the pattern in the impulse response functions is not consistent with
the theory of dynamic loss aversion proposed by BHS, at least in its vanilla form. Once again,
in their model, the asymmetry goes the other way. The reason is that, with the parameters they
calibrate, the cost of risk—the difference between the expected value of a risky prospect and its
certainty-equivalent outcome—changes more after a gain than after a loss for all but the most risky
trades.17
Overconfidence theory could be used to explain the stop-loss effect if it were generalized to allow
for an ebb and flow of confidence, rather than the ratchet effect of successes and failures envisioned
in the traditional formulation. However confidence would have to be modelled in a way that makes
it much more susceptible to losses than gains. Such a theory, which we might label underconfidence,
would represent a departure from the theory of biased self-attribution that underlies overconfidence
theory.
For the dynamic loss aversion model of BHS to explain the stop-loss effect, it needs to be
rejiggered to allow the cost of risk to respond much more strongly to losses rather than gains if it
is to explain our results. One possibility is to allow for a larger slope change in the left arm of the
utility function in Figure 6 following losses. BHS do consider steeper slopes, but point out that
these raise the average level of loss aversion to the point where it may be unrealistic. Moreover,
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to achieve even a symmetric response to gains and losses would require the pivot response of the
utility function to be stronger than the highest response contemplated by BHS. Instead, to alter
the relative impact of gains and losses, we propose the two alternatives sketched in Figure 8. The
first modification, labelled (a), shows the utility function sliding up and to the right after a loss,
rather than pivoting. Under this alternative, losses coming on the heels of earlier losses are no more
painful than before, but gains coming on the heels of earlier losses are more rewarding. The second
modification, labelled (b), shows the left arm of the utility function pivoting up after a gain. In
this instance, losses are less painful following gains, but gains are always equally rewarding. These
modifications, either separately or together, would yield risk-taking behavior that is much more
consistent with what we observe for institutional currency trading.
[Figure 8 here]
As described in Table I, a second level of conditioning that is informative to consider is that with
respect to prior losses. The notion here is that the response to gains and losses documented above
may depend on the cumulation of profits prior to each realization. This bears on the question of
whether managers integrate gains and losses over sequences of trades. In other words, if a manager
sustains a loss L, does he assess the risky payoff pi from a subsequent trade as U(L+ pi), or simply
as U(pi). Integration of outcomes is required if value inflection and in particular the convexity of
the Kahneman-Tversky utility function is to cause disposition effects. BHS interpret the evidence
of Thaler and Johnson (1990) to mean that people do not integrate sequential outcomes. What of
the investors in our data sample?
To answer this, we measure the impact of gains and losses separately, after conditioning on the
previous one-week and one-month loss. Figure 9 presents the one-week and one-month coefficient es-
timates, with standard errors in parentheses. If institutional managers come to the market carrying
pre-existing losses, they are less likely to cut risk after a further loss than they would be if they were
carrying pre-existing gains. This difference is statistically significant at the monthly level. If they
are carrying pre-existing losses and experience a gain, then they are likely to increase risk-taking,
whereas if they are carrying pre-existing gains, they are likely to take profit. Thus there is some
evidence of integration of outcomes. This gives a sense for the dynamics of the utility functions in
Figure 8. Sequences of profits do not produce a continuing upward pivot of the utility function.
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Rather, after a period, the pivot reverses. By contrast, sequences of losses do produce continuing
shifts of the utility function, albeit at a slower rate than caused by the initial loss.
[Figure 9 here]
The final question of interest in this category is whether there are calendar effects present in
the data. The rationale here is that the incentives faced by many fund managers vary throughout
the year. For example, a manager who receives a performance-related bonus is likely to be more
risk-tolerant early in the performance measurement period, reflecting the option-like structure of
his payoffs. Does this carry over to his sensitivity to past gains and losses? Figure 10 shows that
it does. It measures the impulse response functions shown in Figure 7 separately for each half of
the calendar year.18 It’s clear that managers are conditionally more risk-tolerant in the first half
of the year. Gains in the first half of the year lead to incremental risk-taking, but there is no such
evidence in the second half of the year. Correspondingly, losses in the first half produce very little
stop-loss activity: it is only in the second half of the year that managers systematically cut risk
following losses. The clear message is that managers husband their portfolios to a greater degree in
the latter half of the year.
[Figure 10 here]
C. Cross-sectional features
Having investigated the dynamic relationship between risk-taking and P&L, we now turn to the
cross-sectional features of the data. As shown in Table I, we are interested in undertanding whether
the effects identified are pervasive, in the sense that they apply across currencies, fund types and
so on.
[Table II here]
Prospect Theory and Institutional Investors 17
Table II shows the effect of the first eight lags of P&L on risk-taking across each currency and
across the three fund types discussed in Section II. Looking first at the currencies, the basic pattern
observed in the full panel is seen to characterize seven of the ten currencies, the exceptions being
Denmark, Sweden and New Zealand. Trading volume in these currencies is 1.25 percent, 2.43 percent
and 1.46 percent of total volume respectively. Thus the patterns measured earlier apply to the bulk
of currency trading in our sample. Among fund types, the black sheep is the equity category. FX and
bond funds display essentially the same sensitivity to past P&L as was documented earlier for the
full group. Equity funds, by contrast, display a somewhat random response to past performance
that is statistically insignificant. This accords with the folk wisdom that equity fund managers
simply care less about the currency component of their returns. In fairness, it must also be said
that the statistical power of the equity sample is lower, since the number of equity funds, at 71, is
about half the number of currency or bond funds in the sample.
Much has been made in the empirical literature about how investor age and experience can
influence behavioral biases. According to Barber and Odean (2000) and Dhar and Zhu (2002), older
and more experienced retail investors are less overconfident than younger and less experienced retail
investors. As already mentioned, Locke and Mann (2001) use this fact to empirically discriminate
between overconfidence and dynamic loss aversion. We look for a similar pattern among institutional
investors. The sample is split into a formation period—December 31, 1993–December 31, 1999—and
an evaluation period—January 1, 2000–January 1, 2003. A fund’s age is proxied by the fund’s first
trade date during the formation period, and experience is gauged by the numbers of days during
the formation period that the fund actually traded. Then we use a simple two-step procedure. In
step one, the sensitivity of each fund to lagged P&L is measured across the evaluation period. Then
in step two, the cross-section of coefficients is regressed on fund age and fund experience. Table III
reports the results for the first lag of the regression coefficient on total profits, total gains, and
total losses. Both age and experience exert a statistically significant mitigating effect on the total
profit coefficient at the first lag. This suggests that the performance dependence we have observed
is sensitive to learning, as in the confidence model of Gervais and Odean (2001). More interesting,
though, is the fact that, once again, the effect is asymmetric for gains and losses. Age and experience
tend to decrease the magnitude of the coefficient on lagged gains, but to increase the magnitude of
the coefficient on lagged losses. So the older, wiser funds eschew added risk in the wake of gains,
but cut risk more aggressively in the wake of losses.
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[Table III here]
Finally, there is the question of framing. To our knowledge, no existing study has been able to
address this important issue. Does performance dependence operate at the level of a single security,
in which case investors are engaged in narrow framing, or is it driven by the performance of the
portfolio. It is one thing if investors respond to changes in wealth, rather than wealth itself, as
propsect theory would suggest. It is another if changes in wealth are narrowly defined asset-by-
asset. Table IV presents the results. The coefficients are naturally much smaller than the own
P&L coefficients shown in Table II, since conjugate P&L is a much larger quantity on average than
own-P&L. Interestingly, no clear pattern emerges from the coefficients. If we focus on the major
currencies, there is some mild evidence from the point estimates that portfolio profits increase risk-
taking in the British pound, the Australian dollar and Japanese yen, but this doesn’t appear to be
statistically significant. Only for the euro is there significant evidence of an effect, which appears
to be a negative one. Overall, these results suggest that these institutional currency managers are
narrow framers.
[Table IV here]
IV. Conclusion
The sheer level of detail in our dataset has allowed us to learn much about performance dependence
among institutional investors. One could summarize what we have learnt as follows. Past perfor-
mance manifestly affects currency risk-taking. The sign and magnitude of this effect, however, runs
counter to much of the evidence gleaned from data on individual investors. There is no evidence
whatsoever of disposition effects: rather, the dominant characteristic is aggressive stop-loss trading
in the wake of losses. Gains do tend to elicit a mild increase in risk-taking, but this increase reverses
within a calendar quarter. These findings are pervasive across the major currencies, and foreign
exchange and bond funds. However, they do not seem to characterize equity funds.
The patterns observed facilitate discrimination between the various theories of performance de-
pendence. Disposition effect theories are not relevant for this investor class. Both overconfidence
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theories and models of changing loss aversion offer a reasonable explanation for the increase in risk
following profits, but neither does a good job explaining the stop-loss behavior. Our conclusion is
that modifications of overconfidence and dynamic loss aversion models that permits losses to have
much stronger effects than gains offers the best hope of adequately accounting for the observed
investor behavior.
We also learn a considerable amount from conditioning the results on a variety of variables. Time-
of-year matters, in the sense that these investors appear to be more risk tolerant in the first-half
of the year. We conjecture that this owes to the incentives faced by fund managers. In addition,
age and experience matter profoundly: older and wiser funds do not increment their risk-taking
following gains, and are assiduous in cutting risk once losses occur. Finally, all of these effects
appear to be narrow, in the sense that they operate at the level of the individual currency rather
than the portfolio.
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Notes
1On behavioral finance, Fama writes: “[G]iven the demonstrated ingenuity of the theory branch
of finance, and given the long litany of apparent judgement biases unearthed by cognitive psycholo-
gists, it is safe to predict that we will soon see a menu of behavioral models that can be mixed and
matched to explain specific anomalies.” (1998, p. 291)).
2See for example Lakonishok and Smidt (1986), Ferris, Haugen and Makhija (1988) and Heath,
Huddart and Lang (1999). Genesove and Mayer (2001) find evidence of disposition effects in the
housing market, and Oehler et al. (2002) find that it characterizes many world stock markets.
3We use the word “his” advisedly: Barber and Odean (2001) show that men trade more and
earn lower returns than women, perhaps indicating that they are more susceptible to behavioral
biases.
4See Harris (1988) for a discussion of the potential link between transactions costs and disposition
to trade.
5(a) implies that agents care about wealth for its own sake, irrespective of what it implies for
consumption, and (b) introduces a kink in the utility-of-wealth function at the level of current
wealth.
6Grinblatt and Han (2002) and Coval and Shumway (2001) refer to (a), (b) and (c) collectively
as “loss aversion.”
7Institutional holdings now equal 100 percent of GDP in G7 countries, and 200 percent in the
U.S. and U.K. (Davis and Steil, 2001).
8We are exploring this more complex link in related work.
9The list of currencies is: Danish kroner, Norwegian kroner, Swedish kroner, Swiss franc, British
pound, Australian dollar, Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar, Canadian dollar and euro. Prior to
1999 synthetic euro return and flow series are constructed by weighting across the euro member
countries.
10Funds with fixed holdings in excess of equity holdings are defined as fixed income funds, and
vice versa. Currency funds have no equity or fixed income positions.
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1199 percent of the trades value within one year of trade date, so trades with maturity greater
than 265 trading days are ignored.
12The exponential decay rate used is 0.998, implying a half-life of decay for past observations of
about 350 trading days.
13As mentioned earlier, the negative serial correlation evident at order two arises from the spot
trades of fixed income and equity funds.
14In results not reported, we confirm that the changes in risk-taking arise from active trading
rather than simply the passive changes in P&L.
15The results from the other levels of aggregation are similar.
16On the same point, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) write that “...individuals too
strongly attribute events that confirm the validity of their actions to high ability, and events that
disconfirm the action to external noise or sabotage.”
17To see this, note that a 10 percent loss is calibrated to pivot the left side of the utility function
in Figure 6 from a slope of 2.25 to 2.55. This lowers the utility of a subsequent loss by an amount
equal to 0.3 × loss. However a 10 percent gain is calibrated to raise the utility of a subsequent
loss by min{1.25, 1.25× loss}. This is a much bigger number for all but the most extreme negative
realizations.
18The assumption here is that performance measurement periods correspond to calendar years.
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Figures
Figure 1: Holdings by currency aggregated across all funds, 1/1/1995-1/1/2003
Figure 2: Risk exposure by currency aggregated across all funds, 1/1/1995-1/1/2003
Figure 3: Daily sample autocorrelation function for risk aggregates. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. Sketched in lighter weight are 95% confidence bounds.
Figure 4: Daily sample autocorrelation function for P&L aggregates. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. Sketched in lighter weight are 95% confidence bounds.
Figure 5: Impulse response functions for shocks to risk and P&L. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. The sample includes ten currencies and 512 funds. The aggregated by fund
and currency panel consists of a series of length T , where T is the length of the sample period.
The aggregated by currency panel consists of 10 stacked series of length T . The aggregated by
fund panel consists of 512 series of various lengths, depending on fund life. To generate the impulse
response functions, panel VARs for risk and P&L are estimated. The lag length of each VAR is
set at 13 weeks, the value selected by the Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion for the aggregated
by fund panel regression. The VARs allow for heteroskedasticity across currencies and funds. The
vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk. Sketched in lighter weight around each
function are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
Figure 6: Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) utility function for gains and losses
Figure 7: Fund panel impulse response functions for gains and losses. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. To generate the impulse response functions, risk is regressed on weekly lags
of P&L conditional on gains and weekly lags of P&L conditional on losses for the fund panel. The
regression allows for heteroskedasticity across funds and uses the same lag structure as in the VARs
in Figure 5. Sketched in lighter weight around each function are 90% confidence interval bounds
based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
Figure 8: Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) utility functions modified to fit the evidence
Figure 9: Impact of P&L on risk-taking, conditional on past weekly and monthly P&L
Figure 10: Fund panel impulse response functions for first and second half of year. The sample
period is from 1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. The sample is split into the first half of the year (H1) and
the second half of the year (H2). To generate the impulse response functions, risk is regressed on
weekly lags of risk, weekly lags of P&L conditional on gains and weekly lags of P&L conditional on
losses for the fund panel, for each subsample. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across
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funds and uses the same lag structure as in the VARs in Figure 5. Sketched in lighter weight around
each function are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
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Figure 1: Holdings by currency aggregated across all funds, 1/1/1995-1/1/2003
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Figure 2: Risk exposure by currency aggregated across all funds, 1/1/1995-1/1/2003
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Figure 3: Daily sample autocorrelation function for risk aggregates. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. Sketched in lighter weight are 95% confidence bounds.
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Figure 4: Daily sample autocorrelation function for P&L aggregates. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. Sketched in lighter weight are 95% confidence bounds.
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Figure 5: Impulse response functions for shocks to risk and P&L. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. The sample includes ten currencies and 512 funds. The aggregated by fund
and currency panel consists of a series of length T , where T is the length of the sample period.
The aggregated by currency panel consists of 10 series of length T . The aggregated by fund panel
consists of 512 series of various lengths, depending on fund life. To generate the impulse response
functions, panel VARs for risk and P&L are estimated. The lag length of each VAR is set at 13
weeks, the value selected by the Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion for the aggregated by fund
panel regression. The VARs allow for heteroskedasticity across currencies and funds. The vertical
axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk. Sketched in lighter weight around each function
are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
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Figure 6: Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) utility function for gains and losses
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Figure 7: Fund panel impulse response functions for gains and losses. The sample period is from
1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. To generate the impulse response functions, risk is regressed on weekly lags
of P&L conditional on gains and weekly lags of P&L conditional on losses for the fund panel. The
regression allows for heteroskedasticity across funds and uses the same lag structure as in the VARs
in Figure 5. Sketched in lighter weight around each function are 90% confidence interval bounds
based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
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Figure 8: Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) utility functions modified to fit the evidence
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Figure 9: Impact of P&L on risk-taking, conditional on past weekly and monthly P&L
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Figure 10: Fund panel impulse response functions for first and second half of year. The sample
period is from 1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. The sample is split into the first half of the year (H1) and
the second half of the year (H2). To generate the impulse response functions, risk is regressed on
weekly lags of risk, weekly lags of P&L conditional on gains and weekly lags of P&L conditional on
losses for the fund panel, for each subsample. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across
funds and uses the same lag structure as in the VARs in Figure 5. Sketched in lighter weight around
each function are 90% confidence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
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Table I: Taxonomy of questions
Question Rationale
(a) Basic dynamics
Is there performance dependence? Departure from (most of) rational finance paradigm
What is its sign? Negative suggests disposition effects; positive
supports overconfidence/dynamic loss aversion
Magnitude and duration? Economic relevance—is it large and long-lasting
enough to explain major asset pricing anomalies?
(b) Conditional dynamics
Does the impact of losses differ Disposition effect and dynamic loss aversion predict
from impact of gains? asymmetries
Is effect conditioned on Answers question of whether and how investors integrate
performance in prior periods? outcomes over sequences of trades; speaks to theory of
dynamic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang & Santos (2001))
Are calendar effects present? Incentives might alter managers’ risk tolerance
throughout the year
(c) Cross-sectional features
Does effect vary across assets? Is it pervasive?
Does effect vary across Equity, fixed income and currency funds may
fund type? have different response functions
Other relevant fund Age and experience should temper overconfidence
characteristics? (Locke & Mann (2001))
Cross-asset effects? Narrow or broad framing—is it single asset or portfolio
performance that matters
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Table II: Panel VAR estimates broken out by currency and fund-type
P&Lt−1 P&Lt−2 P&Lt−3 P&Lt−4 P&Lt−5 P&Lt−6 P&Lt−7 P&Lt−8
(a) Currencies
Denmark -0.85 1.91 5.12 1.19 1.71 -2.31 -2.89 0.34
(1.86) (1.85) (1.85) (1.85) (1.89) (1.90) (1.88) (1.88)
Norway 10.38 12.14 -0.79 3.91 -3.05 -0.58 7.61 24.94
(8.67) (8.67) (8.65) (8.67) (8.70) (8.67) (8.66) (8.69)
Sweden -6.27 -6.02 3.47 -10.15 0.24 5.18 -13.20 -2.34
(4.54) (4.52) (4.51) (4.51) (4.55) (4.54) (4.52) (4.53)
Switzerland 9.40 2.99 12.58 10.01 4.84 4.13 5.62 3.00
(4.85) (4.88) (4.89) (4.90) (4.92) (4.94) (4.92) (4.93)
U.K. 3.30 29.20 26.62 0.82 28.86 10.69 2.11 18.68
(4.67) (4.67) (4.66) (4.46) (4.44) (4.44) (4.45) (4.41)
Australia 21.45 23.35 13.18 -12.75 -6.70 22.77 23.72 19.81
(5.59) (5.58) (5.55) (5.52) (5.49) (5.48) (5.41) (5.47)
Japan 17.75 14.42 15.33 5.58 -2.01 -5.38 5.98 -7.62
(4.24) (4.24) (4.25) (4.24) (4.24) (4.25) (4.24) (4.24)
New Zealand -26.89 -6.90 -1.61 -1.48 -7.92 -20.91 -5.52 -5.63
(5.68) (5.67) (5.71) (5.61) (5.62) (5.64) (5.60) (5.60)
Canada 10.64 13.87 10.32 1.78 -17.36 -8.61 -5.16 -5.70
(6.26) (6.25) (6.23) (6.21) (6.21) (6.19) (6.19) (6.19)
Euro 19.64 10.80 8.23 -3.94 -5.32 1.45 -7.07 -12.67
(4.27) (4.26) (4.26) (4.27) (4.28) (4.28) (4.26) (4.26)
All 16.61 7.20 9.87 -1.61 -1.99 -0.56 -8.20 -6.53
(2.67) (2.67) (2.68) (2.68) (2.68) (2.68) (2.67) (2.67)
(b) Fund types
FX funds 14.99 6.15 6.16 -6.63 -12.70 1.90 -12.95 -12.01
(4.73) (4.72) (4.73) (4.74) (4.74) (4.74) (4.72) (4.73)
Stock funds -8.18 2.32 -12.62 -19.77 -4.98 24.38 16.43 9.83
(10.72) (10.71) (10.69) (10.68) (10.67) (10.67) (10.66) (10.66)
Bond funds 13.41 4.73 12.37 2.84 3.58 -5.19 -8.36 -6.34
(3.96) (3.96) (3.98) (3.98) (3.98) (3.98) (3.97) (3.96)
This table shows the first eight coefficients on lagged P&L from a 13-lag bivariate panel VAR for risk and P&L. The
sample period is from 1/1/1995-1/1/2003. The model allows for heterscedasticity across funds. Estimation is carried
out by maximum likelihood, stacking all of the funds in the sample. Standard errors are in parentheses. The estimates
are shown by currency and by fund type.
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Table III: The effects of age and experience on performance dependence
βP&Lt−1 βP&Lt−1 βP&Lt−
Total Gains Losses
Age -1.71 -5.72 2.49
(0.91) (1.56) (1.39)
Experience -1.36 -3.47 0.67
(0.65) (1.14) (1.02)
This table illustrates the effect of age and experience on performance dependence. The sample period is from 1/1/1995
to 1/1/2003. The sample is split into two sub-periods. An evaluation period (the last three years of the sample,
1/1/1999-1/1/2003) and a formation period (the initial four years of the sample, 1/1/1995-12/31/1998). A fund’s age
is proxied by the length of time since the first day of trading in our sample, and experience proxied by the number of
days trading. To test sensitivity to these two variables, we use a simple two-step procedure. In step one, the sensitivity
of each fund to lagged P&L is measured across the evaluation period for all funds which exist in that period. Then
in step two, the cross-section of coefficients is regressed on age and fund experience. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table IV: Conjugate P&L results by currency
Conj. Conj. Conj. Conj. Conj. Conj. Conj. Conj.
P&Lt−1 P&Lt−2 P&Lt−3 P&Lt−4 P&Lt−5 P&Lt−6 P&Lt−7 P&Lt−8
Denmark 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Norway -0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.14 0.00 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Sweden 0.15 -0.04 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Switzerland -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
U.K. 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.07 -0.03 -0.02
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Australia 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.12 -0.01 0.32 0.12 0.01
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Japan 0.79 -0.33 -0.89 0.66 -1.26 -0.46 -0.32 0.51
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) (0.62)
New Zealand 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Canada 0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.10 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Euro -0.68 -0.91 -0.05 0.47 -0.81 1.17 0.34 -0.20
(0.22) (0.23) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27)
This table shows the first eight coefficients on lagged conjugate P&L from a regression that also lagged risk and
lagged own P&L as regressors. The sample period is from 1/1/1995 to 1/1/2003. Full regression results are available
from the authors on request. Conjugate P&L is defined as the profit or loss on all currencies except the regressand
currency. Estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood, stacking all of the funds in the sample. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
